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Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat Landscape and Possible Solutions
Siddharth Garg

Citation
Siddharth Garg. "Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat Landscape and Possible Solutions". Talk or presentation, 10, November, 2015.

Abstract
For economic reasons, the design and fabrication of semiconductor ICs is increasingly outsourced. This comes at the expense of trust. An untrusted entity, for instance a malicious designer or semiconductor foundry could pirate the design, or worse, maliciously modify it to leak secret information from the chip or sabotage its functionality. In this talk, I will present my recent work on two defense mechanisms to secure computer hardware against such attacks. The first is split manufacturing, which enables a designer to partition a design across multiple chips, fabricate each separately, and "glue" them together after fabrication. Since each foundry only sees a part of the design, its ability to infer the design intent is hindered. I will propose a quantitative notion of security for split manufacturing and explore the resulting cost-security trade-offs. In the second part of the talk, I will discuss another defense mechanism: logic obfuscation. Previous work has proposed logic obfuscation with seemingly strong security guarantees. I will present a new and effective attack on all existing logic obfuscation techniques, and the security implications of this new attack.

Electronic downloads

Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Siddharth Garg. <a
    href="http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/1155.html"
    ><i>Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat Landscape
    and Possible Solutions</i></a>, Talk or
    presentation,  10, November, 2015.
  • Plain text
    Siddharth Garg. "Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat
    Landscape and Possible Solutions". Talk or
    presentation,  10, November, 2015.
  • BibTeX
    @presentation{Garg15_HardwareSecurityEmergingThreatLandscapePossibleSolutions,
        author = {Siddharth Garg},
        title = {Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat Landscape
                  and Possible Solutions},
        day = {10},
        month = {November},
        year = {2015},
        abstract = {For economic reasons, the design and fabrication
                  of semiconductor ICs is increasingly outsourced.
                  This comes at the expense of trust. An untrusted
                  entity, for instance a malicious designer or
                  semiconductor foundry could pirate the design, or
                  worse, maliciously modify it to leak secret
                  information from the chip or sabotage its
                  functionality. In this talk, I will present my
                  recent work on two defense mechanisms to secure
                  computer hardware against such attacks. The first
                  is split manufacturing, which enables a designer
                  to partition a design across multiple chips,
                  fabricate each separately, and "glue" them
                  together after fabrication. Since each foundry
                  only sees a part of the design, its ability to
                  infer the design intent is hindered. I will
                  propose a quantitative notion of security for
                  split manufacturing and explore the resulting
                  cost-security trade-offs. In the second part of
                  the talk, I will discuss another defense
                  mechanism: logic obfuscation. Previous work has
                  proposed logic obfuscation with seemingly strong
                  security guarantees. I will present a new and
                  effective attack on all existing logic obfuscation
                  techniques, and the security implications of this
                  new attack.},
        URL = {http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/1155.html}
    }
    

Posted by Sadigh Dorsa on 16 Nov 2015.
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