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Nudge: Intermediaries Role in Interdependent Network Security
Jens Grossklags, Svetlana Radosavac, Alvaro Cardenas, John Chuang

Citation
Jens Grossklags, Svetlana Radosavac, Alvaro Cardenas, John Chuang. "Nudge: Intermediaries Role in Interdependent Network Security". 3rd International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2010), Berlin, Germany, June, 2010.

Abstract
By employing an interdependent security game-theoretic framework, we study how individual Internet Service Providers can coordinate the investment decisions of end users to improve the security of the overall system. We study two different forms of intervention: rebates in combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and costsubsidies (pay for effort).

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Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Jens Grossklags, Svetlana Radosavac, Alvaro Cardenas, John
    Chuang. <a
    href="http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/771.html"
    >Nudge: Intermediaries Role in Interdependent Network
    Security</a>, 3rd International Conference on Trust
    and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2010), Berlin, Germany,
    June, 2010.
  • Plain text
    Jens Grossklags, Svetlana Radosavac, Alvaro Cardenas, John
    Chuang. "Nudge: Intermediaries Role in Interdependent
    Network Security". 3rd International Conference on
    Trust and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2010), Berlin,
    Germany, June, 2010.
  • BibTeX
    @inproceedings{GrossklagsRadosavacCardenasChuang10_NudgeIntermediariesRoleInInterdependentNetworkSecurity,
        author = {Jens Grossklags and Svetlana Radosavac and Alvaro
                  Cardenas and John Chuang},
        title = {Nudge: Intermediaries Role in Interdependent
                  Network Security},
        booktitle = {3rd International Conference on Trust and
                  Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2010), Berlin, Germany},
        month = {June},
        year = {2010},
        abstract = {By employing an interdependent security
                  game-theoretic framework, we study how individual
                  Internet Service Providers can coordinate the
                  investment decisions of end users to improve the
                  security of the overall system. We study two
                  different forms of intervention: rebates in
                  combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and
                  costsubsidies (pay for effort).},
        URL = {http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/771.html}
    }
    

Posted by Christopher Brooks on 10 Nov 2010.
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