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An Economic Map of Cybercrime
Alvaro Cardenas, Svetlana Radosavac, Jens Grossklags, John Chuang, Chris Hoofnagle

Citation
Alvaro Cardenas, Svetlana Radosavac, Jens Grossklags, John Chuang, Chris Hoofnagle. "An Economic Map of Cybercrime". The 37th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC) 2009, George Mason University Law School, Arlington, VA, September, 2010.

Abstract
The rise of cybercrime in the last decade is an economic case of individuals responding to monetary and psychological incentives. Two main drivers for cybercrime can be identifi ed: (1) the potential gains from cyberattacks are increasing with the growth of importance of the Internet, and (2) malefactors' expected costs (e.g., the penalties and the likelihood of being apprehended and prosecuted) are frequently lower compared with traditional crimes. In short, computer-mediated crimes are more convenient, and pro table, and less expensive and risky than crimes not mediated by the Internet. The increase in cybercriminal activities, coupled with ine ffective legislation and ineff ective law enforcement pose critical challenges for maintaining the trust and security of our computer infrastructures.

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Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Alvaro Cardenas, Svetlana Radosavac, Jens Grossklags, John
    Chuang, Chris Hoofnagle. <a
    href="http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/772.html"
    >An Economic Map of Cybercrime</a>, The 37th
    Research Conference on Communication, Information and
    Internet Policy (TPRC) 2009, George Mason University Law
    School, Arlington, VA, September, 2010.
  • Plain text
    Alvaro Cardenas, Svetlana Radosavac, Jens Grossklags, John
    Chuang, Chris Hoofnagle. "An Economic Map of
    Cybercrime". The 37th Research Conference on
    Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC) 2009,
    George Mason University Law School, Arlington, VA,
    September, 2010.
  • BibTeX
    @inproceedings{CardenasRadosavacGrossklagsChuangHoofnagle10_EconomicMapOfCybercrime,
        author = {Alvaro Cardenas and Svetlana Radosavac and Jens
                  Grossklags and John Chuang and Chris Hoofnagle},
        title = {An Economic Map of Cybercrime},
        booktitle = {The 37th Research Conference on Communication,
                  Information and Internet Policy (TPRC) 2009,
                  George Mason University Law School, Arlington, VA},
        month = {September},
        year = {2010},
        abstract = {The rise of cybercrime in the last decade is an
                  economic case of individuals responding to
                  monetary and psychological incentives. Two main
                  drivers for cybercrime can be identified: (1) the
                  potential gains from cyberattacks are increasing
                  with the growth of importance of the Internet, and
                  (2) malefactors' expected costs (e.g., the
                  penalties and the likelihood of being apprehended
                  and prosecuted) are frequently lower compared with
                  traditional crimes. In short, computer-mediated
                  crimes are more convenient, and protable, and
                  less expensive and risky than crimes not mediated
                  by the Internet. The increase in cybercriminal
                  activities, coupled with ineffective legislation
                  and ineffective law enforcement pose critical
                  challenges for maintaining the trust and security
                  of our computer infrastructures.},
        URL = {http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/772.html}
    }
    

Posted by Christopher Brooks on 10 Nov 2010.
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